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Does formal contracting foster cooperation in a buyer-supplier relationship? In line with the 
literature, we find that a renegotiable contract with relationship-specific joint investments 
does not make it possible to reach the first-best. However, we show that a renegotiable 
contract may induce more cooperation than an informal arrangement. This result may help to 
understand how cooperation emerges in Japanese procurement practices, which typically 
involve relationship-specific joint investments and renegotiable contracts. 
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Les contrats formels favorisent-ils la coopération dans les relations acheteur-vendeur? En 
accord avec la littérature, nous trouvons qu’un contrat renégociable, avec des investissements 
joints spécifiques, ne permet pas d’atteindre la solution de premier rang. Cependant, nous 
montrons qu’un contrat renégociable peut induire une plus forte coopération qu’un 
arrangement informel. Ce résultat peut permettre de comprendre comment la coopération 
émerge dans les relations de sous-traitance au Japon. Ces relations intègrent typiquement des 
investissements joints spécifiques et des contrats renégociables. 
 
Mots-clefs : Contrats incomplets, investissements spécifiques, coopération 
Classifications JEL : K12, L22, C7 Working Paper SMART-LERECO N◦10-13
Do we need handshakes to cooperate in buyer-supplier
relationships?
1 Introduction
Business research has opposed Western buyer-supplier arrangements against Japanese
ones. Western arrangements, relying on detailed written contracts, have been con-
sidered to be more formal than Japanese ones. Moreover, “an emphasis has been
placed on the idea of Japanese supplier relationships as ‘partnerships,’ or ‘coop-
erative’ arrangements, in contrast to ‘antagonistic’ supplier relations in the West”
(McLaren, 1999: 122-23). McLaren (1999) shows that these international diﬀerences
in buyer-supplier arrangements can emerge in a simple theoretical economic model
without resorting to cultural or attitude diﬀerences. Based on diﬀerences in produc-
tion costs, he demonstrates that an informal ‘handshake’ arrangement, contrary to
a formal contract, fosters cooperation. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) develop
repeated-game models to show that informal agreements and unwritten codes of
conduct, deﬁned as relational contracts, help circumvent diﬃculties in formal con-
tracting. Moreover, Che and Chung (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) consider
cooperative investments in an incomplete contract setting and show that the con-
tract has no value in fostering cooperation. In this paper, we study instead how
formal contracting may promote cooperation.
McLaren (1999) models a procurement relationship, in which a buyer may com-
mission a supplier to produce a tailor-made input. Two procurement arrangements
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are speciﬁed. The ﬁrst arrangement is formal. Parties sign an unbreakable ﬁxed-
price contract, which speciﬁes a date of delivery of the input and a price. The second
arrangement is informal and represents the so-called ‘handshake’ arrangement. Par-
ties agree verbally, without signing a prior contract, that the supplier will produce
the input, while the payment would be worked out later through bargaining. Be-
fore producing the input, that is, ex ante, the supplier can reduce the cost of the
tailor-made input by making two types of process investments, called autonomous
investments and joint investments. Some assumptions are made concerning these
investments. Joint investments are relationship-speciﬁc and require an explicit co-
operation between the buyer and the supplier. Autonomous investments, which the
supplier can undertake on its own, are not relationship-speciﬁc. This implies that
autonomous investment costs are not sunk ex post. Parties can pay an additional
fee to recover the ex ante costs and adapt the tailor-made input to an alternative
buyer. Under this assumption, the unbreakable ﬁxed-price contract gives optimal
incentives for a supplier’s autonomous investments. On the other hand, the exter-
nality of the joint investment is not internalized, and “the supplier will do virtually
no joint investment because it knows that the buyer will have no incentive to do
follow-up work” (McLaren, 1999). Consequently, the contract has no value to foster
cooperation. In contrast, the informal arrangement provides suboptimal incentives
to make autonomous investments, but it fosters cooperation, as the supplier can
always get the buyer to share the costs ex post.
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Assuming that autonomous investments are not relationship-speciﬁc allows McLaren
to study how the market environment aﬀects the arrangement prevailing in buyer-
supplier relationships. Therefore, McLaren stresses the importance of the degree
of vertical integration in an industry, which aﬀects the ﬁerceness of competition in
the market for inputs, as the exogenous determinant of the choice between diﬀerent
arrangements. However, there is a huge literature in transaction cost economics doc-
umenting that autonomous investments are relationship-speciﬁc (e.g., Williamson,
1975, Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978, Joskow 1987). This speciﬁcity rules out
the possibility of adapting the tailor-made input for an alternative buyer but does
not necessarily lead to hold-up problems. When autonomous investments beneﬁt
only the investor, their speciﬁcity is not a source of ineﬃciency (e.g., Chung, 1991
or Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996). In contrast, an ineﬃciency result arises when the
investor makes an autonomous investment that determines its partner’s valuation,
as in Che and Chung (1999) or Che and Hausch (1999). When the investments have
such a ‘cooperative’ nature, the parties cannot do better than to abandon contract-
ing altogether in favor of a simple informal arrangement (i.e., an ex-post negotiation
without a prior ﬁxed-price contract).1 One restriction of this strand of literature
lies in the cooperativeness of investments. They are autonomous, that is, done in-
dependently of the other party, and render direct beneﬁts to the investor’s partner
without involving joint work.
1The ineﬃciency result holds with sequential investments (Che, 2000) or with the introduction of
private information (Hori, 2006).
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We retain here the investment structure of McLaren (1999), who distinguishes
autonomous from joint investments. However, we depart from his analysis by as-
suming ﬁrst that autonomous investments are relationship-speciﬁc and second that
the ﬁxed-price contract is renegotiable. Both assumptions are quite common in the
incomplete contract literature (e.g., Aghion et al., 1994; Chung 1991 or Edlin and
Reichelstein, 1996). The former assumption rules out the external market for the
input and implies that investments are sunk ex post. The latter blurs the distinc-
tion between formal and informal arrangements in interesting ways, as presumed by
McLaren (1999: 125).2 In this framework, we ﬁnd that contracting does not lead to
the ﬁrst-best. On the other hand, contracting is valuable compared to an informal
arrangement. A renegotiable contract promotes some cooperation and is welfare
improving. This result is not necessarily in conﬂict with that on the value of hand-
shakes in McLaren (1999). In fact, in both settings, the possibility of bargaining ex
post fosters cooperation: although the present setting underlines the value of con-
tracting as partial commitment, contract incompleteness leaves room for informal
arrangements.3
This result may help to understand how cooperation emerges in Japanese buyer-
2It is worth noting that with relationship-speciﬁc investments an unbreakable ﬁxed-price contract
implies that the default point value is zero. Since speciﬁc investments are sunk, the break-
up of the contract would generate a loss of value and give optimal incentives to invest. As
a result, it can be demonstrated that if parties credibly commit not to renegotiate their ini-
tial ﬁxed-price contract, optimal cooperation can be reached, by implementing a game of mes-
sages which discloses the relevant information to a third party. See supplementary material on
http://jose.desousa.univ.free.fr/research/sup.htm.
3We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this interpretation.
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supplier relationships. Our framework roughly ﬁts some stylized facts about these re-
lationships. First, parties trade in customized parts, which require autonomous and
joint relationship-speciﬁc investments by the supplier (see among others Asanuma,
1985a,b, 1989; Aoki, 1988, Nishiguchi, 1994, Qiu and Spencer, 2002 and Spencer
and Qiu, 2001). The Japanese automobile is a textbook example of both types of
investments. As an example of joint investments, Japanese car manufacturers co-
operate with suppliers to design parts of the ﬁnal product.4 They coordinate tasks,
share information and meet each other. This cooperation is typically linked to joint
investments, which are the source of productivity improvements over time. Second,
Japanese practices tend to diﬀer from American ones in key areas such as quality
control and price determination. However, characterizing Japanese arrangements
as informal and cooperative and Western arrangements as formal and antagonistic
is a coarse generalization. In fact, the diﬀerence is blurred, as Western ﬁrms have
adopted many Japanese practices (see e.g Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991), while
Japanese ﬁrms contract with their partners (Asanuma, 1985a,b, Nishiguchi, 1989).
Based on a survey of automobile manufacturers, Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) pro-
vide evidence of the contractual nature of the Japanese buyer-supplier relationships.
They ﬁnd that, for each new model of car, parties sign a new contract. “The most
common contract (62 percent of the sample) is 4 years, corresponding to the average
model life-cycle” (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991). Given that the average total du-
4For instance, with the introduction of the airbag systems car manufacturers initiated cooperations
with plastic subcontractors to redesign the dashboard and bear the additional weight of the airbag.
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ration of a Japanese buyer-supplier relationship is about ten years, this means that
parties sign up to three diﬀerent contracts by relationship. As a consequence, they
do not rely simply on handshakes and ex post bargaining. Third, these contrac-
tual arrangements provide room for renegotiation. Parties write basic renegotiable
contracts establishing basic rules covering a range of items including price determi-
nation, payment, delivery, property rights, the supply of materials and quality issues
(Nishiguchi, 1989). Finally, these contractual arrangements also promote coopera-
tion. The typical contract sets a target price for each input produced. Buyers then
cooperate and help suppliers to reach their targets (Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991;
see also Nishiguchi, 1989).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model, a simple two-stage game between a buyer and a supplier. This model departs
from McLaren’s model in two respects: we assume relationship-speciﬁc autonomous
investment and the renegotiability of the contract. In section 3, we establish two
benchmark outcomes to compare our results: the ﬁrst-best and the ex post bargain-
ing (without an initial contract). In section 4, we show that a formal ﬁxed-price
contract arrangement may foster cooperation. Finally, in section 5, we conclude.
2 Model
We consider a basic two-stage procurement model between a buyer (b) and a supplier
(s). The buyer procures an input from the supplier. There are two simple ways of
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procuring the input: a formal or an informal arrangement. The sequence of moves
slightly diﬀers according to the chosen arrangement.
In the formal arrangement, parties design a renegotiable ﬁxed-price contract in
the ﬁrst stage and specify ex ante a ﬁxed monetary transfer (t ∈ ℜ) of the buyer
to the supplier for a ﬁxed quantity of input (q ∈ ℜ+). This initial allocation is
enforceable by the court and ensures for the parties a status quo payoﬀ. Contract
terms are enforced in the second stage, unless they are renegotiated, in which case
parties share ex post the surplus from renegotiation according to their bargaining
strength.
In the informal arrangement, the sequence of events is slightly diﬀerent. In the
ﬁrst stage, parties agree verbally on the quantity of input without signing an initial
contract. In the second stage, they bargain the terms of trade and determine the
payment.
Whatever the arrangement, autonomous and joint investments are not con-
tractible and are made simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage. They are relationship-
speciﬁc, which rules out outside options and the possibility of adapting the input
for an alternative buyer (see above).
Payoﬀ functions and the nature of investments
Let v(q,jb,js) denote the buyer’s gross value of procuring the good q ∈ ℜ+ and
c(q,a,jb,js) the supplier’s gross monetary cost of producing q. Valuations are de-
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termined by relationship-speciﬁc investments. Let a ∈ ℜ+ be the level (and cost) of
autonomous investments made by the supplier. Let jb ∈ ℜ+ and js ∈ ℜ+ be the level
(and cost) of the joint investment contributions made by each party, respectively.5
Throughout this study, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 v and c are continuously diﬀerentiable in all arguments.
Assumption 2 v(q,jb,js) ≥ 0 is increasing in all arguments and strictly concave.
For all q > 0 and (jb,js) ∈ ℜ2
+, it satisﬁes:
lim
q→0v1(q,jb,js) = ∞, lim
jb→0





v1(q,,jb,js) = 0, lim
jb→∞
v2(q,jb,js) = 0, lim
js→∞
v3(q,jb,js) = 0.
Assumption 3 c(q,a,jb,js) ≥ 0 is increasing in q, decreasing in investments and
strictly convex. For all q > 0 and (a,jb,js) ∈ ℜ3
+, it satisﬁes:
limq→0 c1(q,a,jb,js) = 0 lima→0 c2(q,a,jb,js) = −∞,
limjb→0 c3(q,a,jb,js) = −∞ limjs→0 c4(q,a,jb,js) = −∞.
limq→∞ c1(q,a,jb,js) = ∞ lima→∞ c2(q,a,jb,js) = 0,
limjb→∞ c3(q,a,jb,js) = 0 limjs→∞ c4(q,a,jb,js) = 0.
Concavity and convexity of assumptions 2 and 3 imply decreasing returns for
both parties.
5Another way to model cooperation would be to assume that autonomous investments generate
also direct externalities to the partner as in Che and Hausch (1999). A restriction however is that
such autonomous investments render direct beneﬁts to the investor’s partner without involving a
joint work.




+ v(0,jb,js) = 0, and ∀(a,jb,js) ∈ ℜ
3
+ c(0,a,jb,js) = 0.
Assumption (4) says that when q = 0 both valuations do no depend on the level
of investments. Since there is no outside market for investments, this assumption
suggests that investments are relationship-speciﬁc (Chung, 1991: 1034).
Assumption 5 The cross derivatives of v(q,jb,js) and c(q,a,jb,js) satisfy
viℓ(q,jb,js) > 0 and ciℓ(q,a,jb,js) < 0 for all i ̸= ℓ.
Assumption (5) says that investments are complementary.
Assumption 6
v2(q,jb,0) = 0, and c3(q,a,0,js) = 0.
Assumption (6) stipulates that the marginal return of the joint investment is null
when only one party is contributing.
3 Benchmark outcomes
We establish two useful benchmarks, the ﬁrst-best and the no-contracting outcome,
with which later results about contracting may be compared.
3.1 The ﬁrst-best outcome
The ﬁrst-best corresponds to the solution of the integrated ﬁrm program, which
internalizes the eﬀects of investment. The maximization program of the integrated
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ﬁrm is separable. In a ﬁrst step, we determine the optimal quantity (q∗) given
the investment levels. Then, we determine the investment levels given the optimal
quantity.












The net joint surplus of investments S(a,jb,js) is given by:
S(a,jb,js) = (a,jb,js) − a − jb − js,
with (a,jb,js) strictly concave since v(.) is concave and c(.) convex. The eﬃcient
investments are such that (a∗,j∗
b,j∗
s) ∈ argmaxa,jb,js (a,jb,js) − a − jb − js.
Given the assumptions on v and c, (a∗,j∗
b,j∗
s) are unique and satisfy a system of
ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs):


















s) − 1 = 0, (4)
3.2 The (informal) no-contracting outcome
We now consider the no-contracting game. Let us recall the sequence of events. Ex
ante, parties agree verbally, without a prior contract, that the supplier will produce
the input. Ex post, parties share the surplus according to their exogenous bargaining
positions.6 Considering this sequence, we retain the subgame-perfect equilibrium as
the equilibrium solution concept. The optimal quantity q∗ ∈ ℜ+ and the monetary
transfer t ∈ ℜ are determined in the second stage, while investments are realized in
the ﬁrst stage.
At the second stage, the negotiation outcome on q and t is solution of a Nash
bargaining process, with µ ∈ [0,1] the supplier’s bargaining strength:
max
t,q [v(q,jb,js) − t]
1−µ[t − c(q,a,jb,js)]
µ.




6In an incomplete contract framework, it does not seem reasonable to assume that bargaining
positions may be endogenously determined ex ante and enforced.
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and
t(a,jb,js) = (1 − µ)c(q
∗,a,jb,js) + µv(q
∗,jb,js).
At the ﬁrst stage, the buyer and the supplier maximize their surplus:
• for the buyer:
Ub = v(q
∗,jb,js) − (1 − µ)c(q
∗,a,jb,js) − µv(q
∗,jb,js) − jb;
• for the supplier:
Us = (1 − µ)c(q
∗,a,jb,js) + µv(q
∗,jb,js) − c(q
∗,a,jb,js) − a − js.
Given the optimal produced quantity q∗, determined by equation (1) in both
the ﬁrst-best and the no-contracting outcome, we rewrite the above surplus using
(a,jb,js). It follows that parties make the investment levels of the no-contracting
outcome (  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) satisfying
(  ȷb) ∈ argmaxjb(1 − µ)(a,jb,js) − jb,
(  a,  ȷs) ∈ argmaxa,js µ(a,jb,js) − a − js,
and the following system of FOCs:
∂Ub
∂jb
= (1 − µ)2(  a,  ȷb,  js) − 1 = 0, (5)
∂Us
∂a
= µ1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 1 = 0, (6)
∂Us
∂js
= µ3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 1 = 0. (7)
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Since µ ∈ [0,1], eﬃciency cannot be achieved. This may be explained as follows.
Investments are made ex ante, while the surplus is shared ex post according to the
bargaining positions. The payment t is determined independently of the investments
made; therefore, externalities cannot be internalized.
What are the consequences of such an ineﬃciency? Given the concavity of
(a,jb,js), the parties will invest less than the socially optimal level.7
Proposition 1 Under assumptions (1) to (6), the absence of contracting prior to
investing in speciﬁc assets induces under-investments, such that:   a < a∗,   ȷb < j∗
b
and   ȷs < j∗
s.
Proof See appendix.
4 Contracting and cooperation
We have seen that parties do not reach eﬃciency by simply bargaining ex post the
terms of trade without a prior contract. Now suppose that parties sign a simple
renegotiable ﬁxed-price contract that speciﬁes a ﬁxed monetary transfer (t ∈ ℜ) of
the buyer to the supplier for a ﬁxed quantity of goods (q ∈ ℜ+). Two questions
arise. First, does the signing of this simple renegotiable contract make it possible
to achieve eﬃciency? Second, failing that, does contracting oﬀer a better outcome
than the no-contracting game? If not, the contract has no value, and the optimal
contract is the ‘no contract.’
7Note that overinvesting is also a possible and ineﬃcient outcome.
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4.1 The contracting outcome
With regard to the ﬁrst question, we ﬁnd in a simple way that contracting does not
make it possible to reach the ﬁrst-best. This is not very surprising and can be shown
formally.
Let ﬁrst deﬁne the (gross) renegotiation surplus (RS), available ex post as:
RS = (a,jb,js) − [v(q,jb,js) − c(q,a,jb,js)].




v(q,jb,js) − t − v(q,jb,js) + t
]1−µ ×
[
t − c(q,a,jb,js) − t + c(q,a,jb,js)
]µ .





t(a,jb,js) = (1 − µ)[c(q
∗,a,jb,js) − c(q,a,jb,js)] + µ[v(q
∗,jb,js) − v(q,jb,js)] + t.
The ﬁrst stage objectives to be maximized are:
• for the buyer:
Ub = v(q,jb,js) − t
      
A
+(1 − µ)RS
      
B
−jb.
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(A) is the buyer’s payoﬀ given by the initial contract. It represents the buyer’s
status quo position. (B) is the payoﬀ from the renegotiation process, depending
on the buyer’s bargaining strength (1 − µ).
• for the supplier:
Us = t − c(q,a,jb,js)
      
C
+µRS     
D
−a − js.
(C) is the supplier’s cost given by the initial contract. It represents the
supplier’s status quo position. (D) is the payoﬀ from the renegotiation process,
depending on the supplier’s bargaining strength µ.
Parties make the investment levels of the contracting outcome (  a,  ȷb,  ȷs), satisfy-
ing
(  ȷb) ∈ argmaxjb v(q,jb,js) − t + (1 − µ)RS − jb,
(  a,  ȷs) ∈ argmaxa,js t − c(q,a,jb,js) + µRS − a − js.
and the following system of ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂Ub
∂jb
= µv2(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)c3(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 1 = 0, (8)
∂Us
∂a
= −(1 − µ)c2(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) + µ1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 1 = 0, (9)
∂Us
∂js
= −µv3(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) − (1 − µ)c4(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) + µ3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 1 = 0. (10)
Since µ ∈ [0,1], it is not possible to implement the ﬁrst-best outcome. This implies
that contracting with renegotiation does not make it possible to achieve eﬃciency.
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4.2 Contracting or no-contracting?
We fail to achieve eﬃciency with contracting. However, we wonder whether writ-
ing a contract is valuable, that is, if contracting oﬀers a better outcome than no-
contracting. A simple comparison of the no-contracting FOCs (5 - 7) with the con-
tracting FOCs (8 - 10) shows that there is no obvious result regarding the improving
eﬀect of contracting.
The bargaining position (µ) plays an important role in deriving more precise
results about the comparison between contracting and no-contracting outcomes.
Before proceeding to the formal comparison, we consider some critical values of the
parameter µ and two useful lemmas. Then we work out the comparison.
Let ﬁrst deﬁne the set A:
A = {k ∈ [0,1]/kv3(q,jb,js) + (1 − k)c4(q,a,jb,js) ≤ 0,∀q,a,jb,js}.
Let µ = supA. This number exists; if k = 0, the above inequality, used to deﬁne
supA, reduces to c4(q,a,jb,js) ≤ 0, which is satisﬁed ∀q,a,jb,js. The following
useful lemma can now be stated.
Lemma 1 If µ < µ, then: µv3(q,jb,js) + (1 − µ)c4(q,a,jb,js) ≤ 0, ∀q,a,jb,js.
Proof See appendix.
We now deﬁne one other critical value of µ. Consider the set C:
C = {k ∈ [0,1]/kv2(q,jb,js) + (1 − k)c3(q,a,jb,js) ≥ 0,∀q,a,jb,js}.
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Let deﬁne µ = inf C. This number again exists; if k = 1, the inequality, used
to deﬁne C, becomes v3(q,jb,js) ≥ 0, which is satisﬁed ∀q,jb,js. A second useful
lemma can now be stated.
Lemma 2 If µ > µ, then: µv2(q,jb,js) + (1 − µ)c3(q,a,jb,js) ≥ 0, ∀q,a,jb,js.
Proof The proof is the same as the one of Lemma 1. ∥
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we now determine the value of the simple ﬁxed-price
contract in comparison with the no-contraction outcome:
Proposition 2 Suppose that assumptions (1) to (6) hold. If µ < µ < µ, then the
no-contracting outcome generates a general under-investment in comparison with the
contracting outcome. It follows that   a <   a,   ȷb <   ȷb and   ȷs <   ȷs.
Proof See appendix.
The results of propositions (1) and (2) state that no-contracting leads to under-
investments compared to both the ﬁrst-best and the contracting solutions. How-
ever, these propositions do not allow to discriminate between contracting and no-
contracting outcomes in terms of welfare. Contracting would be welfare improving,
if we could prove that (suboptimal) contracting investments are lower than the ﬁrst-
best ones, but over-investment is also a suboptimal solution. The comparison of
the ﬁrst-best and the contracting outcomes depends on the value of q ﬁxed in the
contract. We have the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that assumptions (1) to (6) hold. If q is such that q <
q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs), then the contracting outcome generates a general under-investment in
comparison with the ﬁrst-best. It follows that   a < a∗,   ȷb < ȷ∗
b and   ȷs < ȷ∗
s.
Proof See appendix.
The contracting investment levels (  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) depend on the value of q (see equa-
tions 8-10). It turns out that if q is such that q < q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs), then investment levels
in the contracting case are lower than in the ﬁrst-best outcome.
4.3 Numerical investigations
The two preceding propositions suggest that parameters µ and q play a crucial
role in the comparison of the diﬀerent outcomes (in terms of investments, produced
quantities and total surplus). However, it is not possible to provide precise ana-
lytical results enabling the discrimination between contracting and no-contracting
outcomes. It is also impossible to perform surplus comparisons. To provide in-
sight into the inﬂuence of parameters µ and q on the model outcomes, we conduct
numerical investigations.




























with B0 > 0, b0,b1 > 0, b0 + b1 < 1, β1,β2 > 0, β1 + β2 = 1, 0 < θ < 1, A0 > 0,
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a0 > 1,a1 > 0, a0 − a1 > 1, σ > 0, 0 < ν < 1, α0,α1,α2 > 0 and α0 + α1 + α2 = 1.
Numerical investigations are made using the following benchmark calibration:
Under this parametrization, assumptions 1-6 are satisﬁed. Note that assumptions
5 and 6 concerning the supplier’s cost function are satisﬁed if νa1 − 1−σ
σ < 0.
A graphical presentation of the results is given in Figures 1 - 6. We ﬁrst study
the impact of a variation of the supplier’s bargaining strength µ on the investment
levels, the produced quantities and the total surplus. We consider our three cases,
that is, ﬁrst-best, no-contracting and contracting. Concerning the contracting case,
several values of the ﬁxed quantity q are taken into account. It should be noted that
the contracting case with q = 0 is similar to the no-contracting case.
The numerical experiments suggest that the investment levels (a,jb,js) in the
contracting case are sensitive to the value of the ﬁxed quantity q (see Figures 1 -
3). More precisely, they increase as q grows. Moreover, the results show that the
contracting investment levels are above the no-contracting ones and may be greater
than the levels in the ﬁrst best case. This latter case occurs for high values of q,
that is, when q is about 1.5 times the value of the quantity produced in the ﬁrst-
best case (see table 3). There is a critical value of q, which is roughly 0.24. If q is
less than 0.24, the supplier’s contracting joint investments are increasing in µ (the
supplier’s bargaining strength), whereas the buyer’s contracting joint investments
are decreasing in µ. The converse applies if q > 0.24. Finally, if q = 0.24, the
contracting investment levels are independent of the bargaining strength, higher
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than the no-contracting case and lower than the ﬁrst-best.
Figures 4 - 5 provide a representation in terms of produced quantities and total
surplus. In the contracting case, the produced quantity increases as q grows. Note
that if q is less than the critical value of 0.24, the contracting produced quantity
is increasing in µ and that the opposite is true if q is greater than 0.24. Concern-
ing the total surplus, our simulations show that the no-contracting case surplus is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the ﬁrst-best one. The no-contracting surplus attains a
maximum when µ is approximatively equal to 0.5. However, contracting allows sig-
niﬁcant improvement in the total surplus. It increases as q grows and attains a
maximum. The total surplus decreases thereafter.
Figure 6 provides a three-dimensional representation of the relationship of the
supplier’s bargaining strength µ to the ﬁxed-quantity q and the total surplus in the
contracting case   S. Note that for small values of q and polar values of µ (µ close
to 0 or 1), the contracting surplus tends to be very small. The surface of Figure
6 suggests there exists values of µ and q that maximize the contracting surplus.
Solving a second-best problem8, we determine the values of µ∗ and q∗ maximizing the
contracting total surplus. Results reported in table 4 suggest that contracting may
signiﬁcantly improve the allocation. If µ and q are appropriately set, the contracting
surplus is very close to the ﬁrst-best one (it is less by 1.44%).
8We determine the values of µ and q maximizing the total surplus subject to the set of constraints
constituted by equations (8)-(10).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze two simple ways in which the input could be procured: (1)
a renegotiable ﬁxed-price contract and (2) an ex post bargaining of the terms of trade
without a prior contract. We found that arrangements fail both to achieve eﬃciency
and to provide an incentive for optimal joint investments. A direct implication of
this result is that a process of vertical integration, with a uniﬁed direction, provides
optimal incentives to cooperate.
We also aimed to compare the contracting and the no-contracting solutions. We
found that contracting induces larger autonomous and joint investments compared to
not contracting. Moreover, our formal analysis suggests that the supplier’s bargain-
ing strength and the ﬁxed quantity of input play a crucial role in the comparison
of the diﬀerent outcomes (in terms of investments, produced quantities and total
surplus). Formally, contracting is welfare-improving for values of the ﬁxed quan-
tity lower than a given threshold. Numerically, we have shown that the contracting
surplus is very close to the ﬁrst-best one for appropriate values of the supplier’s
bargaining strength and the ﬁxed quantity of input. Therefore, handshakes are not
always needed to promote cooperation.
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A Proof of proposition 1
It is worth noting that assumption (5) implies that il > 0 for all i ̸= l.






















with λ ∈ [0,1].
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:












The maximization problem (11) has a unique solution, that is, a(λ), jb(λ) and js(λ).
Note that a(1) = a∗, jb(1) = j∗
b, js(1) = j∗
s and a(0) =   a, jb(0) =   ȷb, js(0) =   ȷs.
Deﬁne
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js(λ0) − V (λ).
We necessarily have W(λ) ≤ 0 and W(λ0) = 0. Thus, the function W(λ) attains a maximum
at λ = λ0. At this point, the ﬁrst and second order optimality conditions are necessarily satisﬁed,
we thus have W′(λ0) = 0 and W′′(λ0) < 0.
The ﬁrst and second derivatives of W(λ) are:



















js(λ0) − V ′(λ),
W′′(λ) = −V ′′(λ).




















js(λ0) − V ′(λ0) = 0.
The above expression holds for any λ0. The ﬁrst derivative of V (λ) is then:



















We deduce the expression of the second derivative of V (λ):





















The second order condition W ′′(λ0) < 0 also holds for any λ0. We thus have W ′′(λ) < 0 for all λ.
Consequently:





















Given that µ ∈]0,1[, we necessarily have a′(λ) > 0 or j′
b(λ) > 0 or j′
s(λ) > 0. Suppose for example
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that a′(λ) > 0 and diﬀerentiate the FOCs with respect to λ to obtain:
a′(λ)11 + j′
b(λ)12 + j′
















The cross derivatives ij being negative, we get:
j′
b(λ)22 + j′
s(λ)23 = 1 −
1
1 − µ
− a′(λ)21 < 0,
j′
b(λ)32 + j′
s(λ)33 = 1 −
1
µ
− a′(λ)31 < 0.





































We necessarily have j′
b(λ) > 0 or j′
s(λ) > 0. Suppose for example that j′
b(λ) > 0. The same
argument shows that j′
s(λ) > 0. ∥
B Proof of lemma 1
Consider any values of q,a,jb,js. Deﬁne g(µ) = µv3(q,jb,js) + (1 − µ)c4(q,a,jb,js).
We get g′(µ) = v3(q,jb,js) − c4(q,a,jb,js) > 0.
It follows that g(µ) < g( µ) ≤ 0,∀µ ∈ [0,  µ[.
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C Proof of proposition 2
Let (  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) ∈ ℜ3
+ be the investment levels of the contracting outcome, solutions of the following
ﬁrst-order conditions:
(1 − µ)2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1 − µv2(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) − (1 − µ)c3(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),
µ1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1 + (1 − µ)c2(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),
µ3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1 + µv3(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)c4(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs).
(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) ∈ ℜ3
+ are the investment levels of the no-contacting solution:
(1 − µ)2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1; µ1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1; µ3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1.
Using Lemmas 1 and 2, it can be easily shown that for all µ ∈ [µ,µ]
1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) =
1 − µ
µ
c2(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) < 0,
2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = −
1
1 − µ
[µv2(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)c3(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs)] < 0,
3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − 3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) =
1
µ
[µv3(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)c4(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs)] < 0,
The rest of the proof is similar to the one of the under-investment result in the no-contracting
outcome (see proposition 1). ∥
D Proof of proposition 3
Let (  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) ∈ ℜ3
+ be the investment levels of the contracting outcome, solutions of the following
ﬁrst-order conditions:
(1 − µ)2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1 − µv2(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) − (1 − µ)c3(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),
µ1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1 + (1 − µ)c2(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),
µ3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = 1 + µv3(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)c4(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs).
29Working Paper SMART-LERECO N◦10-13
The above conditions can be rewritten as follows:
1 − 2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = −µ2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) + µv2(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)c3(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),
1 − 1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = −(1 − µ)1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − (1 − µ)c2(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),




+ are the investment levels of the ﬁrst-best solution:
2(a∗,ȷ∗
b,ȷ∗
s) = 1; 1(a∗,ȷ∗
b,ȷ∗
s) = 1; 3(a∗,ȷ∗
b,ȷ∗
s) = 1.
Assumption 5 implies c2 and c4 are decreasing in q and v2 is increasing in q. It is easily deduced
that if q satisﬁes q < q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs), one has:
1(a∗,ȷ∗
b,ȷ∗
s) − 1(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = (1 − µ)[c2(q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − c2(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs)] < 0,
2(a∗,ȷ∗
b,ȷ∗
s) − 2(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = µ[v2(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) − v2(q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),  ȷb,  ȷs)]
+ µc3(q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),  ȷb,  ȷs) + (1 − µ)c3(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) < 0,
3(a∗,ȷ∗
b,ȷ∗
s) − 3(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) = (1 − µ)[c4(q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),  a,  ȷb,  ȷs) − c4(q,  a,  ȷb,  ȷs)]
− (1 − µ)v3(q∗(  a,  ȷb,  ȷs),  ȷb,  ȷs) − µv3(q,  ȷb,  ȷs) < 0,
The rest of the proof is similar to the one of the under-investment result in the no-contracting
outcome (see proposition 1). ∥
E Graphics
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Figure 1: Autonomous investment
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Figure 2: Buyer’s joint investment
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Figure 3: Supplier’s joint investment
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Figure 4: Produced quantities
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Table 1: Benchmark calibration: buyer’s value
B0 b0 b1 β1 β2 θ
10 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.8
Table 2: Benchmark calibration: supplier’s cost
A0 a0 a1 α0 α1 α2 σ ν
10 2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8




0.3252 0.4530 1.2317 0.6391 2.0334
Table 4: Contracting results (q∗ = 0.4571 and µ∗ = 0.6144)
  q   a   ȷb   ȷs   S
0.3206 0.5436 1.1694 0.5259 2.0042
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